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Abstract 
That the concept of Swedish identity and its relation to Swedish history is deeply 
problematic has become increasingly obvious over the last few years. Several books, 
articles and a TV series have been devoted to such questions. In this article the problem 
is discussed within the context of two contrasting standpoints: on the one hand a 
Romanticist nationalist construction of an ‘ancient racial community’ (a myth recently 
dissected by Maja Hagerman), and on the other, an identification with the present and 
the future, rather than with the past. This tendency has been characteristic of the 
Swedish welfare society, and here it is discussed in connection with Berggren-
Trägårdh’s analysis of the specifically Swedish combination of radical individualism 
and a strong reliance on the state.  
Within this context different interpretations of the ‘People’s home’ (folkhem) ideal 
are discussed, and different attitudes to immigration. The article concludes that if the 
dynamics of Europe depend on its diversity, then every national peculiarity may be 
seen as a contribution to these dynamics. In the Swedish case: an acceptance of 
perpetual change, a moderate rate of inequality, a deep aversion to warfare, a tradition 
of constant negotiation and an ambition to search for points of consensus. 
Recasting Swedish historical identity 
In a country which has transformed itself from one of the poorest countries of Europe, 
to one of the richest; from an extremely militarized society to a world record holder in 
unbroken peace, and from a draconically enforced religious conformity to an almost 
complete secularization
1
 – in such a country we should not be surprised to notice a lack 
of consensus about national identity, about what it means to be Swedish.  
In this article the recently reawakened interest in such questions is discussed in the 
context of two competing traditions. 
During the later part of the 20
th
 century – and in some respects already from the 
30’s – Swedish nationalism tended to become a less and less fashionable subject. The 
programmatic modernism and international reputation of the Swedish welfare state 
encouraged a focus on the present and the future, rather than the past, and on the 
international context rather than the internal. Despite the rather low intensity of 
                                                 
1 Sweden as a case of extreme modernization is discussed in Emilsson: Sweden and the European Miracles: 
Conquest, Growth and Voice. Göteborg 1996:10-14. 
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nationalist discourse, Sweden was regularly cited as one of the few real-life examples 
of the nation-state ideal before the post-communist resurgence of national separatism in 
Europe
2
. 
Are we then to conclude that Sweden’s national homogeneity was so self-evident 
that it was unnecessary to assert? And that the absence of nationality problems was a 
precondition for identifying with modernity? 
Not really. Nationalist ideas had flourished throughout and beyond Sweden’s 19
th
 
century, and the modernist paradigm won out only slowly. There are still traces of an 
unconscious or at least unspoken nationalism in the ways many Swedes view the 
world. If you are convinced that you really live in the best country in the world it 
would be tactless to spell it out. 
Also, on such a subliminal level of discrete nationalism old national myths have 
been able to survive unexamined. And if we start to examine them, homogeneity may 
appear much less self-evident. I will presently return to these aspects. 
After Sweden’s hesitant and somewhat reluctant entry into the European 
Communities – and likewise as a consequence of international migration – we have 
been more closely confronted with people having a much more explicit and assertive 
relationship with their historical pasts. This has – at long last – forced us to begin 
reconsidering Swedish history and Swedish national identity. In the last year
3
, several 
books, articles and an ambitious TV series have been devoted to questions of national 
identity and related issues.  
During the later 1990’s the resurgence of interest in Swedish history was becoming 
obvious. When history had disappeared from the list of compulsory school subjects 
within Swedish secondary education in 1991, this had only been the final step in a long 
devaluation of history as an item of social necessity
4
. At least from the Stockholm 
exhibition in 1930, and even more so after the publication of Marquis Childs’ book 
Sweden: the Middle Way in 1936, Sweden had begun to enjoy a growing international 
reputation as the homeland of modernity – ‘the country that shows the rest of the world 
what the future will be like’, to quote a once popular American cliché. 
If a nation is an ‘imagined community’ in Benedict Anderson’s famous 
expression
5
, Sweden’s collective imagination had by this time turned its focus onto the 
present and the future, rather than on its past. The conservative nationalist tradition that 
had grown in strength throughout the 19
th
 century did not give in easily, but the 
identification with modernity proved to be more attractive in the long run, at least until 
Sweden started to drop from its taken-for-granted top positions in international ranking 
lists of economic performance, political stability and high living standards. 
Paradoxically, the high scientific standards of a newer generation of Swedish historians 
challenging the conservative nationalist historians during the interwar period, 
ultimately may have served to undermine the public interest in history. Their 
dedication to uncompromising source-criticism led them to undertake a severe 
                                                 
2 Normally six to eight countries used to be mentioned, including Iceland, Portugal and Albania. 
3  This was writtwn in early 2007. 
4 The devaluation of the history subject is described in Hans Albin Larsson: ‘Consigning history to the past.’ 
Axess Magazine 2006. 
5 Benedict Anderson: Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London 
1983. 
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deconstruction of national mythologies, but the paucity of early historical sources in 
Sweden made large parts of Swedish history look like empty gaps after their revisions. 
A lacklustre history was no match for a glorious present. 
In the early 19
th
 century, when Swedish nationalism had taken shape, the situation 
had been quite the reverse. A lacklustre present was compensated for through 
glorifying the past.  
Today, when we are faced with the necessity of a thorough reappraisal of our latent 
national myths, it is to their point of formulation we have to return. 
When modern nationalisms were being constructed in the early 19
th
 century, they 
were needed to solve quite different versions of the national identity problem. Where 
the French nation had to try and strike a balance between a recent revolutionary 
formulation of common citizenship, and the returning principle of dynastic legitimacy
6
, 
the British had just been confirmed in their national pride and their self-image as 
international upholders of law and order. Within parts of Europe now clearly relegated 
to second-rank status, German and Italian nationalists were beginning to assert 
themselves on the basis of linguistic communities and dreams of resurrecting bygone 
empires. Influenced by Romantic German nationalism, young Swedish poets, 
journalists and historians embarked on a similar venture. But in a very different 
situation.  
For the early German nationalists, the linguistic and cultural community they were 
striving for was, at the time, beyond their reach. Only very different political realities 
would later make a German nation-state a feasible project, but in the truncated Sweden 
a linguistic homogeneity which would have been unthinkable in the polyglot Swedish 
Empire had already entered the domain of possibility. However, this had come about 
not through victorious warfare (as when the German nation-state was finally realized, 
in 1871) but through defeat, and along with it the definitive loss of Great Power status. 
Therefore the bygone glory could be referred to only in very general terms, as they still 
are in the words of the national anthem, but any explicit nostalgia for the Imperial Age 
was evaded. The loss was still too painful. Instead these young nationalists returned to 
the faraway myths that had once occupied the imaginations of the Great Power kings: 
the distant Gothic origin claimed for the Swedish nation. Only this time the warlike 
Goths were imagined to be the ancestors not only of royal dynasties, or aristocracies, 
but of the peasantry as well. Here a new myth was taking shape, an ethnic as well as 
civic nationalism claiming a bond of shared bloodlines between lords and peasants, 
between kings and subjects. 
  This is a fiction that is still alive and kicking: the notion of a racially 
homogeneous population was over the 19
th
 century turned into a pseudoscientific basis 
for Swedish national cohesion, and into an explanation of that Swedish tradition of 
personal freedom which is still treasured as a national heritage. How this came about is 
vividly described in Maja Hagerman’s recent book: Det rena landet. Konsten att 
uppfinna sina förfäder. (”The pure country. The art of inventing one’s ancestors.”)  
The poet-historian Erik Gustaf Geijer invented two national archetypes: the viking 
and the odalbonde (yeoman). Geijer’s odalbonde is conceived as a hard-working small-
                                                 
6  With the suddenly shattered dreams of forcibly leading the world into modernity thrown into the balance, 
it is no wonder that the better part of a century had to be spent in the effort. 
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scale self-owning peasant, proud and independent. He is envisioned as the backbone of 
Swedish society, in contrast to the impatient viking adventurer, who might yet have 
been his brother. That the strong political position of Sweden’s peasantry can be 
explained as an unbroken heritage from the Viking Age, is pure myth. That peasants 
did have a stronger political position in Sweden than in other countries is no myth, 
though, but originally, land ownership had nothing to do with it. That their early civic 
status depended on land ownership, is a misconceived back projection from the 19
th
 
century. By that time, more than a century of market-oriented agriculture had finally 
segregated the peasantry into either proprietors or proletarians
7
. These are not 
Hagerman’s arguments, however. She concentrates on the lack of archeological 
evidence of an egalitarian society, and on the construction of European racism, where, 
she shows, prominent Swedish scientists, historians and authors took an active and 
important part. 
What, then, about the presumed racial homogeneity? Hagerman shows how 
archaeologists and anthropologists from a surprisingly narrow social circle – people 
who were each other’s pupils or teachers, ate breakfasts together and married off their 
children to each other – succeeded to create an ideal image of Sweden as an Eden of 
racial purity
8
. This was achieved in a close dialogue with the international pioneers of 
racist theory, and eventually they succeeded to sell this idea to the Swedish public 
through museum exhibitions, encyclopedia articles and massive popular campaigns. 
That Sweden became the first country to create an institute of Racial Biology was 
therefore no inexplicable aberration, but a measure of the success of the pure-blood 
lobby, and of their scientific prestige. Few people today would talk about a national 
treasure of unmixed Aryan blood, but the notion of Sweden’s homogeneous population 
is by no means eradicated. For instance, I have quite recently been criticized in an 
international review by a Swedish professor for neglecting the importance of the 
homogeneity factor in my discussions of Swedish history within a comparative 
European context.  
To evaluate the realism of the homogeneity notion, it is necessary to look even 
further back in history. To the extent that it is meaningful to talk of ethnic identity 
except in a quite subjective sense, there existed several different ethnic groups within 
the late 18
th
 century Swedish realm. Even if we would surmise that patriotic 
propaganda and the uniquely efficient centralization of the early-modern Swedish state 
would by this time have succeeded in welding together the earlier regional identities – 
Westgothians, Dalecarlians, Smallanders, Northlanders and so on – into a unitary 
Swedish identity, there were also seven recently conquered provinces populated by 
Danes and Norwegians.  
                                                 
7 See my arguments in Emilsson: Before the ‘European Miracles’. Four Studies in Swedish Preconditions 
for Conquest, Growth, and Voice. Göteborg 2005 and in ’Jordbrukets kommersialisering och splittringen av 
bondeståndet – en uppgörelse med odalbondemyten’ (Forthcoming article in Forskningsfronten flyttas fram 
2007).  
8 The evidence invoked largely consisted of cranimetric statistics interpreted as indications of language-
group affinities; in this way prominent Swedish archaeologists and historians could claim to have proved 
the descent of contemporaneous Swedes from stone-age Germanic ancestors. As the databases were 
manipulated to exclude ‘untypical’ skulls at both ends of the time spectrum, the similarities are hardly 
surprising.  
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Today these provinces are considered totally Swedish, but by the time Geijer and 
his associates started to formulate a Swedish nationalist discourse, they had only been 
under Swedish rule for a century and a half. An efficient carrot-and-stick policy of 
harsh indoctrination and civic integration had turned their population into Swedish 
citizens, but this result can hardly be interpreted as ethnic homogeneity. Political or 
civic homogeneity, perhaps, but it is the ethnic discourse I am questioning. And still I 
haven’t even mentioned the Finnish people or the aboriginal Sami. Finland had been an 
integral part of Sweden for the better part of a millennium, and their peasants were 
represented in the Diet along with those from present-border Sweden. Their noblemen 
and burghers were often of non-Finnish descent, but also within Sweden, these estates 
contained a considerable proportion of foreign origin: Noblemen and burghers of 
German, Baltic, Polish, Scottish, Dutch or French extraction. At the other end of the 
status spectrum, there were social outcast categories like gypsies and tattare 
(“travellers”). The Jewish element in Sweden has up to the very recent been largely 
invisible due to earlier religious discrimination and later wariness of antisemitism, but 
the European Union has now given Yiddish minority language status in Sweden, along 
with Romani, Finnish, two Sami languages and the Swedish-Finnish borderland idiom 
Meänkieli
9
. 
To what extent this kaleidoscopic mixture could be considered more homogeneous 
than the populations of any other European country seems highly uncertain. I consider 
it an unproven national myth
10
. To the extent that Swedes have been convinced by this 
propaganda, it may have created a subjective homogeneity, but this is surely no 
‘national treasure’. On the contrary, it is a national danger, as it may impede 
adjustment to reality. The large proportion of recent immigrants might not have the 
chance to choose freely between individual and collective integration, or whatever 
personal mixture of these strategies they might come up with, if they are always 
contrasted with a massive imagined conformity. 
In this context another important recent reconsideration of Swedish identity should 
also be mentioned: Är svensken människa (“Are Swedes human?”) by Henrik Berggren 
and Lars Trägårdh. Their discussion concerns the Swedish self-image – the title is 
borrowed from one of their examples out of the large Swedish self-castigating literature 
– and their principal and quite convincing thesis is that the Swedish culture is at the 
same time extremely individualist and strongly reliant on the state. The explanation of 
this seeming paradox, is that the state guarantees our independence from other 
collectivities and thus leaves us free to choose our own commitments – and even more 
important: our non-commitments. Of course this is more of a utopia than a description 
of reality, but an important point is that to many outsiders this type of freedom would 
not seem all that attractive. Surprisingly, the authors trace the development of this 
radical individualism from the same writer, Erik Gustaf Geijer, who is cited by 
                                                 
9 Which has earlier in general been considered a Finnish dialect, although this official recognition should 
support its pretentions to language status. 
10 The late (14th century) abolition of slavery in Sweden, and the important role of Swedish vikings in the 
European slave-trade,  
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Hagerman as the leading inventor of Swedish conservative nationalism
11
. In his old age 
Geijer had astonished the Swedish public by converting to liberalism, and it is the 
radical old man, not the young conservative, that is discussed by Berggren-Trägårdh. 
Carl Jonas Love Almqvist, Ellen Key and Alva Myrdal mark the most important 
further steps toward statist individualism, although Strindberg and Astrid Lindgren are 
also discussed. 
The statist-individualist analysis is complemented by something the writers term 
“the Swedish theory of love”. According to this ‘theory’ true love can exist only where 
the lovers are completely independent of each other. Stated in such a stark form it 
sounds almost frighteningly demanding and existentialist, but it is hard to deny that the 
line of reasoning sounds familiar to a Swede.  
This whole story may sound totally unrelated to Hagerman’s, and in many ways it 
is. It is a mentality consistent with the modernist paradigm that is reconstructed by 
Berggren-Trägårdh, while Hagerman strives to uncover the hidden remnants of the old 
reactionary nationalism. Still, both of these studies are deeply concerned with the 
relevance for the present of notions from the past, and in that respect they are 
complementary. 
A consistent statist-individualist immigration policy would give every immigrant 
the chance of formulating his or her own individual version of integration and would 
therefore tend to attract those presumptive immigrants who would appreciate a free 
choice, whatever their cultural background. This would be in sharp contrast to the 
different versions of cultural essentialism, where people are identified with their 
cultural background and either are expected to conform to it or demanded to give it up 
in favour of full assimilation. The first of those alternatives resembles the British policy 
criticized by Amartya Sen
12
, who makes a forceful case for respecting the individual 
identities of immigrants and minority members, as against Tony Blair’s strategy of 
negotiating with so-called ‘responsible leaders’ for immigrant communities. The 
second alternative resembles the Danish, where the demand for full assimilation leads 
to the need of unequivocal criteria for what you are expected to conform to, and thus to 
the construction of an increasingly monolithic version of Danishness. As both of these 
uncomfortable alternatives correspond to tendencies articulated also in the Swedish 
debate, the statist-individualist position might be a constructive basis for a third way.  
This should also be more compatible with the ideology of the Swedish welfare 
state. This is still often envisioned in the terms of the folkhem (‘people’s home’) vision 
from the 1928, when Social Democrat chairman and eventual prime minister Per-Albin 
Hansson formulated the almost utopian notion of society as a ‘good home’ for the 
people: a home where there are no mistreated stepchildren or pampered favourites. 
Eventually, a surprisingly broad consensus formed around this ideal, which was hardly 
seriously questioned before the Thatcher revolution started to make an impact on 
Swedish politics. 
In the present-day debates the limitations of this vision has often been stressed, and 
Maja Hagerman at times seems to suggest that the notion of a ‘people’s home’ was 
                                                 
11 The Swedish literature on Geijer is voluminous. For a detailed discussion in English of his role in 
formulating Swedish nationalism, see Peter Hall: The social construction of nationalism. Sweden as an 
example.Lund 1998. 
12 Amartya Sen: Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny. New York 2006 
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only possible because of the imagined consanguinity. This is by no means the only 
possible interpretation though. Today the folkhem ideal is most conspicuously 
propagated by two diametrically opposed political parties: on the one hand by the 
avowed internationalists of the Left-wing Party, and on the other by the crypto-racist 
isolationists in the Sweden Democrats. To claim that the people’s home ideal is 
premised on the exclusivity of a narrowly bounded nationalism, may amount to a self-
fulfilling cynicism that concedes the victory before the match has started.  
That the vision is compatible with a racist world-view doesn’t mean that it is a 
racist notion. From the very beginning, the concept has been ambiguous and contested. 
Per-Albin Hansson picked up the catchword from conservatives like Rudolf Kjellén, 
and re-charged it with an egalitarian content
13
. In Hansson’s formulation, the edge was 
turned against class injustice, but it might just as well be given an anti-racist 
interpretation, if gipsies and travellers are to be counted among the ‘stepchildren’ that 
deserve an equal place at the table. The ‘people’s home’ ideal was contested from the 
beginning, and could be given a radical turn as well as a conservative one. The struggle 
over the right interpretation continues, and if we view it in the light of the Swedish 
modernist tradition, it would be most natural to see it as mutable and redefinable. The 
open-door version of the ‘people’s home’ ideal that can be found in Olof Palme’s 
rhetoric may seem hopelessly idealist and out of date, but even within the context of 
the European Union, something along the same lines could offer a much better 
comparative advantage to Sweden than would any version of an ethnic definition of 
Swedishness. Swedish self-understanding has always had a strong civic component, 
resembling the American version of nationalism in that freedom and democratic 
participation has been envisioned as a national heritage
14
. Whatever the level of 
exaggerated idealization involved in that viewpoint, there are several characteristics of 
Swedish society and culture that are remarkable in a comparative context, and have 
deep historical roots: broad popular participation, a high level of legitimacy for the 
state, a tradition of constant negotiation, a search for consensus, a deep aversion to 
warfare, a moderate rate of inequality and a positive view of change. If Berggren and 
Trägårdh are right we could also add a more specific characteristic: a positive view of 
the state as the guarantee of our right and ability to be truly individual. 
If Sweden no longer heads the ranking-lists in standard of living or economic 
growth, we still seem to embrace modernity – or what is now often described as post-
modern values – to a higher extent than most other countries. When we discuss 
Swedish culture and Swedish traditions, we should not forget that perpetual 
modernization has by now become one of our most distinctive traditions. 
When I have studied and compared different contemporary theories about Europe’s 
historical rise to world dominance, I have found only one real point of consensus. In 
one way or another, everyone stressed the dynamic importance of the simultaneous 
interaction and independence of the societies that together constitute Europe
15
. If we 
would accept diversity as a fundamental characteristic of Europe – perhaps even the 
                                                 
13 Hans Dahlkvist: ‘Folkhemsbegreppet – Rudolf Kjellén vs Per Albin Hansson’ Historisk Tidskrift 2002:3. 
14 Clearly visible already in the rhetoric of the Peasant Estate during the 17th century: ‘We know that in other 
countries, the commonalty is held in thrall, and we fear that the same will befall us, who are yet born a free 
people.’ (my translation). 
15 Emilsson 1996:8 and 2005:126ff. 
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most fundamental one – then every national or regional variant of the European 
development should be expected to present its own pecularities, which would constitute 
their respective contributions to the diversity of Europe. Such a perspective might lead 
to a wariness about unnecessary harmonizations (which could weaken the dynamic 
properties of multiplicity), but on the other hand, it would certainly offer no support for 
isolationism.  
If the search for Sweden’s role in a changing and expanding Europe would make us 
turn back towards the conservative nationalism of the young Geijer and abandon the 
radical individualism which the old Geijer paved the way for, we would have adapted 
to eurosclerosis and missed the opportunity to take an active part in the modernization 
of an entire continent, or more. For a country that was once described as the social 
laboratory of the world, that would be a sorry ending indeed. 
 
